No More Rocking Horses: Trading Business-Cycle Depth for Duration Using an Economy-Specific Characteristic. by Ossama Mikhail
No More Rocking Horses: Trading Business-Cycle
Depth for Duration Using an Economy-Speciﬁc
Characteristic.
Ossama Mikhail a,∗
aDepartment of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida,
4000 Central FL blvd., CBA 2-302, Orlando, FL 32816
Abstract
Regarding the trade-oﬀ between the depth and the duration of recessions, there exists a mounting
empirical evidence of the idiosyncratic and non-synchronized behavior of the business cycle over
time within and across countries. In this paper, I propose a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium
formulation wherein an economy-speciﬁc characteristic - labeled as the missing parameter - (e.g., the
ﬁnancial institutional framework and regulations) does control the magnitude, severity and persistence
of the business cycle. The results of the simulations show that as much as 0.5 of a percentage point
of GDP in depth and a relative diﬀerence of 3 years duration can be attributed to this parameter.
Overlooked for decades, this missing parameter hypothesizes that Frisch’s ‘rocking-horse theory’ of
the business cycle is an inaccurate description of the business-cycle behavior.
JEL classiﬁcation: B22, B25, B41, E32, F15, G28, P16.
Keywords: Business Cycle, Depth, Duration, Frisch’s Rocking-Horse Theory, Economic Institutions,
Real Business Cycles.
∗ I thank the Florida Macroeconomics Study Group (FMSG) participants for helpful comments.
Email address:
omikhail@bus.ucf.edu, Phone (407) 823-4258, Fax (407) 823-3269 (Ossama Mikhail).
URL:
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/omikhail (Ossama Mikhail).
22 Fe bruary 20041I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ever since the seminal paper by Ragnar Frisch (1933), the ‘rocking-horse theory’ of the
business cycle 1 (also referred to as the Cassel paper, after the volume in which it appeared)
became the base and the antecedent of most macroeconomists dynamic pursuit to understand
and explain business cycles. Build on Wicksell’s original 2 idea, Frisch outlined a distinctive
separation and a clear dichotomy between the impulse problem and the propagation problem
of random shocks that impinge on the economy.
“There need not be any synchronism between the initiating force or forces and the move-
ment of the swinging system. This fact has frequently been overlooked in economic cycle
analysis. If a cyclical variation is analysed from the point of view of a free oscillation, we
have to distinguish between two fundamental problems: ﬁrst, the propagation problem;
second, the impulse problem.” Frisch (1933, p. 171)
For the decades that followed, many propagation mechanisms [horses] were proposed to un-
cover the nature of the business cycle (e.g., see Zarnowitz (1985) for a thorough review).
Upheld and implicitly practiced in most macrodynamic research, the framework for anal-
ysis centered around the following question. “All business cycle research seeks clariﬁcation
on a basic, classical question: What are the sources and propagation mechanisms for the
boom/bust patterns of economic ﬂuctuations in modern economies?” Quah (1995, p. 1595).
1 ‘If you hit a wooden rocking-horse with a club, the movement of the horse will be very diﬀerent
to that of the club.’ Frisch (1933, p. 198). The ‘rocking horse model’ was received and hailed as a
landmark in applied econometrics. Statistical analysis of the business cycle, such as the research
by Persons and Mitchell, emphasized the measurement of and attempted to isolate the cycle. For
a complete review, refer to Morgan (1995, pp. 92-93).
2 Frisch reported that the original idea of his model was due to Wicksell. “Knut Wicksell seems to
be the ﬁrst who has been deﬁnitely aware of the two types of problems in economic cycle analysis
- the propagation problem and the impulse problem - ...” Frisch (1933, p. 138).
2Explaining the shape of the business cycle has been (and still is) a concern for researchers. 3
Based on the premise of a ‘rigid’ impulse problem, - that is once speciﬁed at the outset, will
not change its characteristics, - and following Frisch dichotomy, most studies argue/propose
diﬀerent propagation mechanisms by which the shock get translated and ampliﬁed into a
fully developed business cycle. Questions regarding the business cycle are addressed and
mostly framed in a ‘rocking-horse model’, if answered. Racing to the ﬁnish line, non-uniﬁed
strata of models [horses] exist and compete for a universal acceptance.
In this paper, I propose a formulation, wherein the standard benchmark model conforms to
Frisch’ theory: the impulse is the technology shocks and the propagation is carried through
a ‘time to build’ as outlined by 4 Kydland and Prescott (1982). The suggested formulation
allows for an economy-speciﬁc parameter that does control the severity [magnitude] and the
persistence of the business cycle. By knitting the propagation and the impulse problems into
a single parameter, the model proposed here is able to generate diﬀerent depth-duration
trade-oﬀs based solely on the behavior of this economy-speciﬁc parameter.
Missing from the bulk of stochastic general equilibrium models, I hypothesize that this
parameter is economy speciﬁc, in the sense that the shape and format of a country’s ﬁnancial
institutions/regulations do contribute to the magnitude and persistence of its business cycles.
The parameter serves two functions: it is an integral part of the economy productive capacity
[structure], and it controls the degree of persistence of the shock [impulse], therefore this
formulation puts into question the merits of the dichotomy, as proposed by Frisch.
3 Among many, see Harding and Pagan (2002), and Sheﬀrin (1988).
4 For the aﬃnities between Frisch’s work and Kyland and Prescott (1982), see Hoover (1995).
3To re-phrase my proposal in terms of Frisch’s physical analogy, I suggest the following ex-
ample. Not all horses are made with the same materials. Following a shock, wooden rocking
horses [dirigiste economy] will rock [swing] more than rocking horses made with soft materi-
als. Soft-material rocking horses [ﬁnancially integrated and well-developed institutions] will
absorb part of the shock, i.e., will swing less. As for the question of persistence, and due to
the natural laws of physics, the terminology breaks down, as it is diﬃcult to visualize shock
persistence in soft-material made rocking horses.
2 Question and Political Economy
Do economic institutions, ﬁnancial integration and regulations play a role in the shape of
the business cycle? If the answer is in the aﬃrmative, then the natural extension to the
question is; what kind of role and to what extent do these factors deform the character of
the business cycle? In brief, I propose a formulation to answer the following question. What
is the inﬂuence of an economy-speciﬁc parameter on the shape of the business cycle? Here,
I focus on the shape of the business cycle as articulated by its depth and its duration. 5
Identifying the nature and character of the business cycle is of importance to political
economists. One constant in globalization research, is that both sides - opponents or propo-
nents of economic reforms - agree that these economic reforms bring economic growth and
a deformation of the character of the business cycle. 6
5 The question posed here is diﬀerent and broader than the one examined in Mikhail (2003),
wherein the business cycle consequences of undertaking an economic-reform agenda (as proposed
by the ‘Washington Consensus’) are addressed.
6 In this paper, I abstract from the debate regarding the proper or appropriate ‘sequencing’ of
4A direct consequence of the suggested hypothesis in this paper, is that a dirigiste economy
might face a higher risk of political instability (Blomberg and Hess (2002) and Farr, Lord,
and Wolfenbarger (1998)). To protect its governing economic power, a dirigiste economy that
resists economic liberalization might end up with a higher probability of political instability in
a self-defeating mode and a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Due to the nature, extent and functions of
its economic institutions, a dirigiste economy does not absorb much of the shock, and suﬀers
from a higher amplitude [larger business cycle swing] that creates a fertile environment for
political instability. 7
3 Review of the Literature
The motivation of the paper builds on a paramount business cycles [empirical] studies that
reported evidence of idiosyncratic and non-synchronous behavior regarding the magnitude
and the persistence of the cycle. The empirical fact of changes in the severity and persistence
of business cycles is well documented and concede at a varying rate to the evidence suggest-
ing that business cycles are no longer similar, nor linked, over time within or across countries.
For the U.S., a moderation in output ﬂuctuations is observed. Blanchard and Simon (2001),
Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Ramsey and Rothman (1996)
and Stock and Watson (2002a) reported evidence of changes in the character of the U.S.
business cycle. In international data, output volatility and the non-synchronous behavior
economic reforms measures (See Edwards (2000, 2003) and Stiglitz (2002)). As an interesting agenda
for future research, is to investigate how diﬀerent ‘sequencing’ leads to diﬀerent characters of the
business cycle.
7 See Blomberg and Hess (2002) wherein they reported strong evidence of dependence between
internal conﬂict, external conﬂict, and the state of the economy. Their results suggested that re-
cessions can provide the spark for increased probabilities of internal and external conﬂict.
5are documented in Ambler, Cardia and Zimmermann (2004), Artis, Kontelemis, and Osborn
(1997), Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999), Carvalho and Harvey (2002), Clark and Shin (2000),
Dalsgaard, Elmeskov and Park (2002), Del Negro and Otrok (2003), van Dijk, Osborn, and
Sensier (2002), Doyle and Faust (2002a, 2002b), Fritsche and Kouzine (2003), Heathcoate
and Perri (2002), Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), Helg et al. (1995), Kose, Prasad, and Ter-
rones (2003), Luginbuhl and Koopman (2003), Mills and Wang (2000), Simon (2001). For
a complete summary and a thorough analysis of the empirical facts, see Stock and Wat-
son (2003). Regarding the trade-oﬀ between depth and duration, Edwards, Biscarri and de
Gracia (2003) concluded that cycles in emerging countries tend to have shorter duration
and larger amplitude/volatility than in developing countries. For the period of post ﬁnancial
liberalization, the study reported that Latin-American stock markets behaved similarly to
stock markets in developed countries whereas Asian countries have become more dissimilar.
In this paper, I argue that economic institutions that are speciﬁc to each economy - e.g.,
structure of the ﬁnancial institutions, economic policy and regulations - hold the key to the
shape of the business cycle. If two economies, one that is institutionally well-developed and
the other is under-developed, face the same negative exogenous shock, then the institutionally
developed one will have a cycle that displays: lower amplitude and longer duration. To
conﬁrm with the empirical facts presented in the literature, I hypothesize that this missing
economy-speciﬁc parameter could be similar in value at a group-level of countries.
What makes two similar economies behave diﬀerently when faced with the same shock? for
example, the Canadian and the U.S. economies exhibit diﬀerent business cycle characteristics
to the extent that few have argued that it must have been diﬀerent shocks that impinged on
6both. With similar technological trends in Canada and the U.S., it is unlikely that technologi-
cal change can lead to a relatively high and persistent unemployment in Canada when it does
not have that eﬀect in the U.S. (Sharpe (1999, p. 31)). I view this argument as inaccurate
for the following reason. It is widely accepted that both countries tend to face similar tech-
nological trends, the Canadian economy is characterized by relatively diﬀerent institutional
structures and public programs, - e.g., the independence of the Bank of Canada relative
to the Federal Reserve System, and the deregulation regarding ﬁnancial institutions. Also,
relative to the U.S. economy, some industries are non-existent in the Canadian economy and
others are under-represented. In terms of existence and functioning, these gaps impinge on
the speed of recovery during a recession. I argue that, faced with a technology shock similar
to that in the U.S., the Canadian economy will experience higher persistence in terms of
output and unemployment deviations. This relative higher persistence of the business cycle
can be captured by the missing parameter as a function of the ﬁnancial institutions structure
and public programs in Canada.
There are few empirical studies that suggested an institutional root/cause to the changes in
business-cycle ﬂuctuations and focused on institutions as the primary source of profound in-
ﬂuence on economic development. Acemoglu et al. (2003, pp. 89-90) noted that “Our interpre-
tation of these results is that a fundamental determinant of thirty-year volatility diﬀerences is
institutional diﬀerences across countries, and that institutional diﬀerences create economic
instability through a variety of microeconomic channels as well as the often-emphasized
macroeconomic channels.” Artis et al. (2003) acknowledged the role of institutions in dating
the business cycle. Djankov et al. (2003) studied the structure of eﬃcient institutions, and
7the politics of institutional choice and their inﬂuence on economic development.
The missing parameter suggested here is time and country dependent. As countries revise
and change the functioning of their institutions over time, the shape of the business cycle
changes accordingly. As countries close the functioning gap between their institutions, their
business cycles become similar. 8
My attempt to theoretically capture institutional inﬂuence on economic volatility is not
without empirical evidence. Across the U.S., Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2003) examined
economic volatility and its relation to banking integration. They investigated how the better
integration of U.S. banks across states has aﬀected economic volatility within states. Their
hypothesis was that bank integration tends to dampen the impact of bank capital shocks
on state activity, but it ampliﬁes the impact of ﬁrm collateral shocks. Empirically, the net
eﬀect has been stabilizing, as year-to-year ﬂuctuations in employment growth within states
fall as that state’s banks become better integrated (via holding companies) with banks in
other states. These magnitudes are large, and the eﬀects are most pronounced in states with
relatively undiversiﬁed economies.
4 The model and Results
The economy is characterized by a large number of identical consumers. The single consumer
is assumed to be representative 9 of the society as a whole. Representative agents’ preferences
8 See Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) for the empirical evidence regarding the Euro zone.
9 For a comprehensive development of the representative agent in macroeconomics modeling, refer
to Hartley (1997).
8are represented by a utility function which is time separable in consumption and leisure, and




















kt+1 =(1− δk)kt + it (3)
logAt+1 =(1− ψµ)logA + ψµlogAt +  t+1 (4)
ct + it ≤yt (5)
lt + nt ≤1( 6 )
ct,n t,l t,k t and yt refer to consumption, labor, leisure, capital and output, respectively. Et
refers to the expectation operator. At denotes the technology shock. The subjective time
discount factor β is constrained to 0 <β<1 and is deﬁned as β ≡ 1/(1 + ρ), where ρ is
t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e .α and δk refers to the capital share in income and the capital
depreciation rate, respectively. There is one ﬁnal good in this economy, and it is produced
according to a constant returns to scale neoclassical production function given by Equation
(2). Equation (3) is the capital law of motion, i.e., ‘time to build’ for capital. Equation (4)
describes the evolution of the technology shock, and  t denotes white noise. Equations (5)
and (6) are the resources and time constraints, respectively.
I integrate an exogenous economy-speciﬁc parameter into a standard real business cycle
model to investigate the merit of the ‘trade-oﬀ between depth and duration’ statement. Of
interest to the hypothesis proposed in this paper, the parameter µ is constrained to the
interval 0 <µ≤ 1 in equations (2) and (4). µ refers to the missing parameter that controls
9the shape of the business cycle. Think of µ as an absorption rate parameter. A higher value
for this parameter is equivalent to a higher absorption rate of the technological shock. In
other words, the higher µ is, the lower is the amplitude of the business cycle swing and the
more persistent is the business cycle. Here, I assume that µ is exogenous and it could be
identiﬁed and estimated using both: the economic freedom index and the Solow’ residuals,
for example. This parameter is endogenous to the institutional and regulatory framework
operating in the economy. Further studies can address the endogeneity, identiﬁcation and
estimation of this parameter.
Note that if µ = 1 (no absorption), then the proposed model reduces to a standard real
business cycle model, wherein 0 <ψ<1 is the sole parameter that control the persistence
of the shock.
Subjected to a stochastic technology shock At, the structure of the economy absorbs part of
this shock (1/µ). Also, the structure of the economy controls how persistent the shock is (µ
in Equation (4)). As for how the economy absorbs and controls the persistence of the shock,
I assume that it is due to the nature, extent and functions of its institutions. In this setup,
an institutionally well-developed structure (i.e., a higher value for µ) will cushion the depth
of recessions.
The model is solved and simulated with sensitivity to the structure following Uhlig (2001,
p. 38). The log-linearized system is solved using numerical rational expectations (see the
Appendix, Section 7). The calibrated parameters are chosen to ensure that the capital to
output steady state value matches the U.S. sample data. The quarterly calibrated parameters
used to generate the impulse responses are: β =0 .99,α=0 .36,δ k =0 .025 and ψ =0 .95.β
10is set to imply a steady-state real interest rate of 1 percent per quarter. α is set to match
the average fraction of total income going to capital in the U.S. economy. The depreciation
rate (δk) is set to imply a steady-state ratio of capital to output of approximately 10 and a
ratio of investment to output of 0.26. ψ and the standard deviation σ  =0 .007 are set equal
to the same value used by Prescott (1986). γ is computed from the steady-state and equals
2.5.
There is no single point estimate for the parameter µ, therefore I address this issue by
calibrating the model with diﬀerent set of points for this parameter (µ ∈ {0.01,0.5,0.99}).
Figure 1 presents the impulse response for output following a shock to technology under
three diﬀerent rates µ ∈ {0.01,0.5,0.99}. At µ =0 .01, the eﬀects of the shock ends after one
year, whereas at µ =0 .99, the eﬀects last for (at least) 4 years. A relative diﬀerence of 3
years persistence in the business cycle is attributed to this parameter. The relative diﬀerence
in the depth stands at a 0.5 percentage point of GDP. The Figure illustrates how can one
parameter be responsible for the depth-duration trade oﬀ. The higher µ is, the higher is the
absorption rate and the lower is the amplitude of the business cycle. The lower is the value
of µ, the less persistent is the cycle.
5E x t e n s i o n s
The model proposed here is broad enough to serve as a basis for a multitude of interesting
a n dv i a b l ee x t e n s i o n s .A ni m m e d i a t ee x t e n s i o no ft h em o d e l ,i st os e tt h ep a r a m e t e rµ as µi
(i =1 ,2), where 1 and 2 refer to the degree of shallowness and persistence of the business
11cycle, respectively. µ1 and µ2 should replace µ in Equations (2) and (4), respectively. This
parametrization implies that the parameter is diﬀerent in value for the amplitude relative
to persistence, but still inﬂuenced and determined by the economy structure, i.e., µi =
f(institutions). A useful application of such a derivative is to compare the Canadian and the





2 , in the sense that both economies share the same amplitude, but the
Canadian business cycle will persist more relative to the U.S.
Future research could address the endogeneity of the parameter µ and more speciﬁcally, the
speed at which economic reforms cause changes in this parameter. Each economy possesses
an institutional characteristic that is speciﬁc and heterogeneous to the other economies.
Within each economy, this characteristic is time variant 10 and policy/regulations dependent,
formally, µit = f(institutionst).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I presented a formulation wherein an economy-speciﬁc characteristic - labeled
as the missing parameter - (e.g., the ﬁnancial institutional framework and regulations) does
control the magnitude, severity and persistence of the business cycle. This formulation could
be perceived as a return to the Institutionalist School. It emphasizes the role of institutions
in economic life and advocates that ﬁnancial institutions can mitigate the sharp swings of
10 The issue of time-varying structure is proving promising in explaining business cycle character-
istics. See Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2003) and Ferrero (2003) wherein a prototype growth
model with time-varying wedges were proposed.
12the business cycle. However, unlike the old-institutionalists, this model does not condemn
laissez-faire, but embraces it. Also, the model implicitly provides a role for an exogenous
process (e.g., the government) to revise the role of its ﬁnancial institutions.
Conditioned on the calibrated parameters, the simulation results suggest that an economy-
speciﬁc parameter is suspect for the depth-duration trade oﬀ that is observed over time
within and across countries. As much as 0.5 of a percentage point of GDP in depth and a
relative diﬀerence of 3 years duration can be attributed to this parameter.
The results give rise to a host of questions. Of main concern, how immune is the standard
RBC model to the Lucas’ critique? If a policy that induces an institutional shift/transition
across economic regimes results in changing this parameter, wouldn’t the simulated welfare
impact (gains/losses) from that policy be inaccurate if based on the ‘rigid’ assumption of a
non-institutional varying impulse?
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167 Appendix (not for publication)
Write the log-linearized system as,
0=Axt + Bxt−1 + Cyt + Dzt
0=Et [Fxt+1 + Gxt + Hxt−1 + Jyt+1 + Kyt + Lzt+1 + Mzt]
zt+1 =Nzt +  t+1 Et [ t+1]=0
where xt denotes the state vector, yt refers to the jump variables and zt refers to the exogenous
ones. It is assumed that N has only stable eigenvalues. Using Theorem 3.2 in Uhlig (2001,
p. 38), we solve for the recursive equilibrium law of motion
xt =Pxt−1 + Qzt
yt =Rxt−1 + Szt














Ik ⊗ AI k ⊗ C












given that all eigenvalues of P are less than unity in absolute value. We choose the root(s)
manually. C+ denotes the pseudo-inverse of C. C+ =( C0C)−1C0. C0 ≡ (null(C0))0. The C0
is found by singular value decomposition of C0. Note that C0C =0 .

























Figure 1. Impulse Responses for Output - µ ∈ {0.01,0.5,0.99}
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